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THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION AT 50




My role is to provide a keynote and an overture. Then you
will hear a fuller development by the orchestra.
My overture begins with a familiar theme, "Happy Birth-
day": we are celebrating the 50th birthday of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.'
As I was thinking about this birthday, I became interested
in the conception of the Universal Declaration. I would date
the conception of the Universal Declaration as January 6,
1941, the date of what became a famous speech by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Speaking when the world was at
war, although the United States had not yet joined the war,
President Roosevelt declared four freedoms that for him were
to be the core of a new world order. In effect, he projected the
internationalization of human rights: "In the future days which
we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded
upon [the four freedoms]."
As we start, I will say a word about why we celebrate. I
heard Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, say she does not celebrate the Declaration
because as she looks around the world she sees so many terri-
ble things happening. She is not willing to celebrate the Decla-
ration, but only to mark it.
I think celebration is appropriate. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was proclaimed on December 10, 1948.
This year, 1998, its 50th birthday is celebrated widely. It is
being celebrated all year long. It is being celebrated every-
where-in China, in Russia, in South Africa, in the United
States. The Universal Declaration has a claim to being perhaps
* University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University. This essay was adapt-
ed from a transcript of Professor Henkin's Keynote Address, given at Brooklyn
Law School on November 5, 1998.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A_ Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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the most important instrument of the 20th century, although it
has long been commonly unappreciated or erroneously appreci-
ated. So, I celebrate it. And I suggest four reasons for celebra-
tion, under four headings: 1) the transformation of human
rights from an idea to an ideology; 2) the definition of human
rights; 3) the universalization of human rights; and 4) the
internationalization of human rights.
II. WHY WE CELEBRATE
A. Human Rights: From Idea to Ideology
The first reason for celebrating the Declaration is that it
transformed an idea into an ideology, a philosophical idea into
a political ideology. The Universal Declaration seized on the
idea of natural rights, an idea conceived by English and Euro-
pean philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries and made it
an ideology for our time. The idea of natural rights had a tem-
porary life as an ideology at the end of the 18th century in the
American Declaration of Independence and the American Con-
stitution, and in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen.' But then it disappeared as a universal ideol-
ogy. In France it died in the Reign of Terror. There was not
much said about rights in France between 1793 and 1946-a
long time. In the constitutions and draft constitutions of the
French Republic in the intervening 150 years, one can hardly
find anything about rights. The French had a decent society,
but they didn't talk about rights (in many ways the French
moved toward British parliamentarianism and away from
individual rights).
The United States stuck to its idea of rights. We like to
forget, however, that in the United States the idea of rights
was tarnished; it suffered from genetic defects. Remember
slavery. Remember that there was no vote for women. The
word equality was not in the Constitution. It took a long time
for us to become the society we became after the Civil War by
way of the 14th Amendment. And the true development of
human rights in the United States did not have its birth until
after the Second World War. Perhaps, even, the Universal
2. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN, reprinted in, THE
CONSTITUTION AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE
1789-1907 15 (2d ed. 1908).
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Declaration contributed to that birth.
The Universal Declaration was drafted fifty years ago. The
people who produced it, people of different cultures, wise peo-
ple, practical people, men under the leadership of a wise, prac-
tical, inspiring woman, Eleanor Roosevelt, created this docu-
ment, established an ideology of human rights and made it an
ideology for the world. That is the first reason to celebrate the
Universal Declaration.
B. The Definition of Human Rights
The second reason for celebration one might put under the
heading of "definition." The words "human rights" are pleasant
colloquial words: you believe in rights, and believe in humans;
you say "human rights." An American, Attorney General
Randolph, used the phrase human rights in 1792 in an argu-
ment in Chisholm v. Georgia,3 one of the earliest cases in the
history of the United States. Chief Justice John Marshall used
the term in Fletcher v. Peck4 a few years later. We also find it
in the Abolitionist literature before the Civil War.
One hundred years later the phrase "human rights" came
into vogue again. The Allied victors used it at Dumbarton
Oaks when they began to plan the world order for after the
war. Those who met in San Francisco to found the United
Nations seized on these words. The U.N. Charter contains the
words human rights, but does not define the phrase. There is
no doubt that it meant "anti-Hitler" and anti-"crimes against
humanity." But that was hardly enough.
The Universal Declaration took those two words, human
rights, and developed them into a catalogue of reasonably
precise articles. It began with an established basic value, "hu-
man dignity", and derived 30 Articles from it. The Declaration
has become the definition of human rights which the world
lives by, or should live by, or aspires to live by.
I refer to the Universal Declaration as the birth certificate
of the Human Rights Movement. It is also a marriage certifi-
cate. It established a particular idea of human rights: it took
the rights of the liberal state, the rights that we talk about as
"freedoms", and married them to the benefits of the welfare
3. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
4. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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state. Some say that talk about these rights is the mark of
socialism. But it was not Marx; it was Bismarck's, the conser-
vative Iron Chancellor of Germany who introduced the welfare
state into Europe. Following him, the French and the British
developed their own versions. But this essential contribution
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had its more
recent antecedents in Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He spoke of
freedoms, not rights, but his freedoms included "freedom from
want." The Declaration made F.D.R.'s freedoms into rights.
The Universal Declaration confirmed and consecrated that
marriage. It treats them equally. It uses no sub-headings; the
terms political-civil rights and economic-social rights are not in
the Universal Declaration. The Declaration doesn't suggest any
difference between them: it links them together. This definition
of human rights is the second reason for celebrating the Uni-
versal Declaration.
C. The Universalization of Human Rights
A third reason is in its title: the Universal Declaration.
The drafters took an idea which Americans used to think of as
their own, which the French might have thought of as their
own, and universalized it. The rights catalogued are now uni-
versal human rights. They are the rights of all human beings.
It is the responsibility of all societies, and of international
society, to see to it that these rights are realized.
There is a common misconception about the Universal
Declaration. People talk about the Declaration as an interna-
tional instrument, and of international human rights. The
Declaration is international in one sense: it came out of an
international body, the U.N. General Assembly.
But it is not a treaty among governments, it is a declara-
tion; and it is universal, not international. It was produced by
an international body, but its target was national societies
around the globe. Although referred to as a catalogue of inter-
national human rights, strictly speaking there are no inter-
national human rights. What we have is a system of interna-
tional law and international institutions that render the rights
of human beings subject to national law within national societ-
ies, under international supervision.
The Universal Declaration declares that there are national
human rights in every society everywhere. And the world has
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accepted that. The states that existed at the birth of the Uni-
versal Declaration in 1948 accepted it. They were followed by
all the states that came into the system thereafter, another
150 of them. All the states in the world have accepted it.
Every new constitution, and many old ones that have been
revised, have borrowed, copied, incorporated by reference, and
plagiarized the Universal Declaration. I am not suggesting
that 190 countries now have fine human rights records as a
result, but almost all countries have made a commitment to
the human rights ideology which the Universal Declaration
represents. For example, look at China. China officially cele-
brated the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration and
signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights5 which derives from the Universal Declaration. This, in
effect, brought one billion human beings under the mantle of
the human rights ideology. Moreover, we should look beyond
China. The Soviet Union, which abstained in 1948, agreed in
writing to the Universal Declaration principles in the so-called
Helsinki Accords.
The Universal Declaration is a universal document for
universal rights for all human beings in all societies. That is
another good reason for celebrating it.
D. The Internationalization of Human Rights
The fourth reason for celebrating is the internationaliza-
tion of the human rights ideology. Before the end of World War
II, how a state treated its own inhabitants was nobody else's
business. That was an axiom of the international system and
of international law. The Universal Declaration, together with
the U.N. Charter, together with Nuremberg Charter, together
with all that happened later, put an end to the notion that a
state can treat its own inhabitants as it chooses. Since I am in
the certificate business, I point out that the Universal Declara-
tion is the death certificate of that axiom of international law.
It is also the birth certificate of the international human rights
movement. Now human rights everywhere are the responsibili-
ty of everyone. That's why we celebrate.
5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) reprinted in
6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBALIZATION
The second theme of this conference, the challenge of glob-
al markets, relates in important ways to the internationaliza-
tion and universalization of human rights.
The term globalization, though now common, is imprecise.
It is a catch-all term that means many things. It means "the
market," the Internet, and lots of trade and exchange across
state lines. It means considerable control by international
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. It means the network of multinational
companies, and it means transnational migration. It means so-
cial, cultural, political, and certainly economic interaction
across national boundaries and around the world.
Globalization is beginning to homogenize culture. Coca-
Cola is known around the world; so are cellular telephones and
e-mail. More important than the goods and the devices is what
comes through them. It is very hard to cut off communication,
as the Russians learned during the era of the Soviet Union and
as the Chinese are learning today, when people in even remote
areas of Asia and Africa are sitting with a cellular telephone or
a personal computer. If globalization is moving us towards a
less diverse culture, then "cultural diversity" may be a fading
concept. One general impact of globalization may be the slow
growth of something closer to a universal culture.
The more important question for us is the impact of global-
ization on human rights in the world we know, a world of
nation states: not world government, not nongovernment, but a
world where nation states continue to be relevant.
Globalization occurs within and across the state system.
Multinational companies and the financial markets operate
within one or more states and are subject to international
(inter-state) treaties and other laws, the customary law of
human rights, and inter-state covenants and conventions on
human rights will continue to apply in the age of globalization.
Human rights law will continue to develop. We can only
speculate about its contours, but states remain responsible for
the activities of global companies. Some states may have trou-
ble exercising that responsibility. They may not wish to exer-
cise that responsibility. But as a matter of law, and as a mat-
ter of politics, states continue to be responsible.
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Also, the Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law6
declares that a state violates international law if it practices,
encourages or condones genocide, slavery, torture, or inhuman
or degrading treatment. This raises the question whether a
state is condoning them when it permits its companies to com-
mit such acts. Is a state complicitous in such acts if it stands
by watching?
The world has been challenging multinational companies
on many fronts-the use of coerced labor, of child labor, and
challenges to companies for encouraging a government to relo-
cate a few million people so the company can build a pipeline.
These challenges require sorting out the relationship between
the responsibility of states and the responsibility of companies
and what the international system ought to do about it.
Globalization means an increasing responsibility of busi-
ness with respect to human rights. This will take many forms.
When a big company lays off thousands of employees in some
country where there is no "safety net", the company may be
asked to supply the safety net. The local government may call
on the company to step into the breach.
There is also another angle to accountability by global
companies. A case called Filartiga7 concludes that for 200
years the U.S. federal courts have had jurisdiction-although
they did not know it-of civil suits by aliens for violations of
the law of nations. The Filartiga case began right here in
Brooklyn, with Judge Nickerson of the Eastern District of New
York, who handled the case before and after it went to the
Second Circuit. Since then there have been at least twenty
similar cases in the courts of the United States.
Recently, a district court in California entertained a suit
by Burmese farmers against Unical of California, alleging that
the company knew that the Burmese regime was relocating
masses of people and using forced labor to build a pipeline to
carry the company's natural gas. The court is entertaining the
suit; it did not dismiss it out of hand. If this case stands, we
may have companies responsible for actions they take in their
global operations litigated in the courts of the United States.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1987).
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Since foreign governments are immune to suit in U.S.
courts and foreign officials are difficult to sue and to recover
from, what about suits against U.S. multinationals? Compa-
nies created here or operating here may be answerable here
under U.S. law, including international law, for their own
actions or failures to act. They may also be answerable here for
violations by their local subcontractors. They may have to
accept some responsibility for any involvement they have in
human rights violations in countries where they operate. If the
Unical case proceeds, it may affect other multinationals and
other human rights abuses in other countries.
There is child labor, slave labor, prison labor with which
U.S. companies may be involved; they may not be exempt from
U.S. law. Even if U.S. laws and institutions do not now reach
abroad, the lengthening arm of U.S. consumers, investors,
shareholders, and human rights NGO, do.
The companies, especially the big ones, have begun to feel
vulnerable. Companies other than Unical, such as British Pe-
troleum, Shell, Heineken, and others have become more sensi-
tive and more vulnerable. This is not necessarily because they
are afraid of what foreign governments might do to them, or
what the United States government might do to them, or even
what a suit in the U.S. federal courts might accomplish. They
are worried about their vulnerability to brand tarnishing, to
investor resistance, to shareholder resistance. In addition to
doing things which in the days of apartheid in South Africa we
used to call "voluntary" codes, such as the Sullivan Principles,
companies are doing more. Shell has put out a small primer on
human rights for all of its managing employees. British Petro-
leum has taken similar action. There is an organization called
Ethic which, as of 1994 or 1995, had 500 participants. This
development means that big companies have become sensitive
to human rights. As a result, we are seeing "voluntary" codes.
The best known are the ones about child labor in the clothing
apparel industry.
At this juncture the Universal Declaration may also ad-
dress multinational companies. This is true even though the
companies never heard of the Universal Declaration at the
time it was drafted. The Universal Declaration is not ad-
dressed only to governments. It is "a common standard for all
peoples and all nations." It means that "every individual and
every organ of society shall strive-by progressive measures...
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to secure their universal and effective recognition and obser-
vance among the people of member states." Every individual
includes juridical persons. Every individual and every organ of
society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyberspace.
The Universal Declaration applies to them all.
So, in the second half-century of the Universal Declara-
tion, the idea-ideology of human rights challenges states to
address their responsibility for human rights in the world of
the next century. It challenges states to enforce their obliga-
tion to respect and ensure rights against violation by the mar-
kets and companies which states can curtail. It challenges
"private" institutions to recognize their responsibility, whether
or not states do.
Let us celebrate the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Let us also think, and study, and do. All of us.





May I say that it is always a real pleasure to be at Brook-
lyn Law School. It is by no means my first visit, and I have
enjoyed every visit that I have paid to this law school.
Today's topic of the relationship of human rights to the
global marketplace, is a fascinating one, and I have ap-
proached this problem partly from the standpoint of contract
law, because that, as Professor Murumba has indicated, was
one of the first subjects that I looked into in some depth. I will
therefore give you some perspectives from that point of view.
II. THE ECONOMIC SUBSTRATUM OF HUMAN RIGHTs
May I commence by saying that every human right has an
economic substratum. There is an economic infrastructure to
whatever human right you may name, whether it be the right
to life, equality, dignity, even the right to found a family, the
right to a pure environment, the right to motherhood, and so
on. All of these are integrally linked to an economic substra-
tum, for without that economic substratum, the right cannot
possibly exist in practical terms, whatever be the theory sur-
rounding it.
Thus it is not only when we talk of economic rights that
we are talking of a concept which has a relationship to eco-
nomics. The linkage exists through the whole spectrum of
human rights, including every species of civil and political
rights as well. Seminars such as this are therefore greatly to
be welcomed, for they turn the human rights spotlight on the
economic infrastructure which sustains the whole edifice of
human rights.
The thought that every human right has an economic
background which lies behind it prompts the thought that in
recent times high commerce, the free marketplace, and free
trade seem to have become values in themselves. We have
* Vice-President, International Court of Justice, The Hague.
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become accustomed to speaking of these as given preconditions
to modern life, which stand apart from and independent of
their moral basis. By becoming ends in themselves, they have
obscured the fact that they are only the means to an end, and
that one of those ends is to provide that supporting structure
which is a sine,qua non for the enjoyment of human rights.
Economic interests and ethical concerns seem, moreover,
to have become locked up in separate compartments. They are
two parallel worlds which exist side by side with no necessary
interrelationship between them. The whole economic enterprise
of the modem world seems thus to be on the way to escaping
from societal control, and sometimes even from the grip of the
law. And, worst of all, they are progressively divorcing them-
selves from the humanistic attitudes which should be the basis
of all regulatory systems. This gives much cause for concern,
and scholars have indeed been at work upon it,' but much still
remains to be done.
Ill. THE ANALOGY OF TECHNOLOGICAL POWER
This reminds me of a related area where the same phe-
nomenon is evident. I think there are two great juggernauts
that are careering almost uncontrolled in the modern world.
Apart from economic power which I have already mentioned,
the other is the force of technology, whether in association with
commerce or not.
Science and technology have grown largely out of social
control, out of the control of legal systems, out of the control of
human rights. And that is a matter which I have addressed in
other forums and in other writings, and especially in a book
just released by Kiuwers on Protecting Human Rights in the
Age of Technology.2
The first of these juggernauts-economic power-has es-
caped from the controls of legal systems in many areas where
it seems to function as a power entity in its own right. And
1. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE
(Friedl Weiss, et al. eds., 1998).
2. See generally CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, 2 JUSTICE WITHOUT FRON-
TIERS: PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY (1998). For an
earlier study foreshadowing this problem, see CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, THE
SLUMBERING SENTINELS: LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WAKE OF TECHNOLOGY
(1983).
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this is something that has caused great concern to all of us
who are interested in, and concerned with, human rights.
It is useful to devote a few moments to attempting to un-
derstand how we have come to the point of a divorce of market
mechanisms from their moral base.
IV. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
I think all traditional systems have had a great deal to say
about the fairness of commercial dealings. Trade and enter-
prise were indeed proper activities, but only so long as they
were kept within the moral framework-the mores-of each
society. I could amplify this from various cultures, and I could
refer to the attitudes of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam to-
wards all economic transactions. Their prohibition of the un-
conscionable advantage, the unequal bargain, the unjust price
and usury, and their emphasis on good faith and fair dealing
were woven into their legal systems and societal attitudes.
Righteous conduct, as understood in Buddhism and Hinduism,
extended through the whole gamut of human conduct, and the
trader was not for one moment exempted from the reach of
this principle. The strictures of Islamic law in relation to the
notion of interest are well known. These moral restraints were
legal restraints as well, and there was no notion of freedom of
trade which could cut itself adrift from these moral moorings.
A. Early Christian Attitudes
Let us now look at the Western tradition.
If you look at the initial attitude of Christianity towards
commercial enterprise, the early church fathers were strongly
of the view that economic activity must always be subject to
the principles of morality.
How much can one sell a commodity for? One must sell it
for a fair price. What is that fair price? It is a price which you
pay to get the raw materials plus a reasonable addition for
your labor. Gratian, in his Decretals,3 for example, distinguish-
es between the craftsman who buys wares and transforms
them by his efforts, and is thus entitled to the increase result-
3. See GRATIAN, DECRETUM, Pt. I, dist. XXXVII, art. IV; See R.H. TAWNEY,
RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A HISTORICAL STUDY 35 (1926).
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ing from his labors, from "the man who buys it in order that he
may gain by selling it again unchanged and as he bought it,
that man is of the buyers and sellers who are cast forth from
God's temple."
Thus the conduct of those who made profits by buying an
article for X and selling it for X plus Y, without having added
anything to it, was stigmatized by the earlier writers as un-
Christian and immoral. The profits made were described by
the church fathers as turpe lucrum--disgraceful profit, so to
speak. This was reprehensible conduct and fell into the catego-
ry of the sin of avarice, along with usury. Those were two of
the prohibited areas of activity which have a relevance to what
we are looking at.
The two doctrines of the just price and the prohibition of
usury prevailed right up to the time of Aquinas. Indeed, Aqui-
nas formulated the principle of the just price and refined it in
very elaborate terms.
B. The Shift to the Notion of the Just Price
Now, as we travel along from the time of Aquinas and we
reach the 14th century, we find a slight shift, and the
schoolmen were beginning to say that while there is of course
the principle of just price, there was some room for variation
when one considered the method by which one fixed the just
price.4 The just price was attainable through freedom of con-
tract, which resulted in a bargain between two people, one of
whom is a willing seller, and the other a willing buyer. The
fact of the bargain shows that both parties were satisfied and
this is an indication that the price is fair. So, you get that
slight shift coming into evidence in the 14th century.
C. The Personal Relationship between Buyer and Seller
But trade, of course, was marching ahead and it was mov-
ing towards the mass production of goods through mechaniza-
tion. The idea of a fair price fixed through free bargaining
evolved in the context of a very personal relationship between
producer and purchaser. At that stage, there wasn't this mass
mechanization, and the massive industrialization which sepa-
4. See TAWNEY, supra note 3, at 36.
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rate the two parties to the contract to the extent that they do
not know each other and are separated from each other by
many almost impenetrable barriers. Today you buy something
from somebody, a manufacturer you do not know, who has sold
it to a trader you do not know, who in turn has sold it to an
importer you do not know, who again has sold it to the retailer
you may or may not know. The manufacturer is thus very re-
mote, and the product has come through a whole chain of sup-
pliers who eliminate personal relationships. The personal rela-
tionship which obtained in the old days was probably a factor
that made the early moralists look into this in great detail.
With mechanization of production, the importance of this per-
sonal relationship receded into the background.
D. The New Trading Routes and the Discovery of America
Another important factor in the process of depersonaliza-
tion was reached with the vast increase of trade over enormous
distances which resulted from the discovery of the new trading
routes to the East, pursuant to the capture of Constantinople.
This was augmented by the discovery of the Americas and the
influx of vast amounts of wealth into Europe. Commerce multi-
plied severalfold in magnitude and, there was an unprecedent-
ed expansion of trading contacts. The importance of trade was
also elevated to the point where commerce and empire went
hand in hand, and the great traders were not second in impor-
tance to the princes and the generals. We see the emergence of
great financial houses and enormous bourses, as in Antwerp,
for example. These great merchants were potentates in their
own right, and were theoretically free to do as they pleased,
stretching their financial power as far as they could, without
regard to the moralities which the Church had attached to
commerce. Yet, it is interesting to note that the great mer-
chants of Antwerp, even then, even at the height of their pow-
er and influence in the 16th and 17th centuries, would send
their confessors or their religious advisors to the learned places
of the world to seek an opinion-that is, a theological opin-
ion-as to whether their activity in the field of commerce could
be justified in morality and according to the principles of reli-
gion. For example, the Antwerp merchants used to send their
spiritual advisors all the way to the University of Paris to find
out whether the activity they were indulging in was morally
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
blameworthy, or could pass muster according to the moral
principles taught by religion.
As historians of the time point out, the great merchants of
the Dutch East India Company would have their spiritual
advisors overlooking their activities and breathing down their
necks, so to speak, to ensure that their massive commercial
operations conformed to the dictates of morality.' This was
due to the strictness of the moral regime resulting from vari-
ous facets of the Reformation.
E. Lutheran Attitudes
Let us now look at these developments in the light of Prot-
estant teaching. Let us first observe the influence of Martin
Luther. Luther's thought was set against the background of a
basically agricultural society. He still adhered to the old values
of personal dealing in trade. International trade, banking and
credit, and capitalist industry-all these, according to Luther,
belonged to the Kingdom of Darkness, and here is a quotation
from Luther:
Who is so stupid as not to see that combinations are mere
outright monopolies which even heathen civil laws... con-
demn as a plainly harmful thing in all the world?6
He was, in other words, emphasizing the Christian virtues
and frowning on these enormous extensions of capitalist enter-
prise which he saw in his day, and which, with his rural per-
spective, he did not quite get to grips with.
F. The Influence of Calvinism
Then, we encounter the magisterial influence of Calvin.
Calvin approached the problem from the standpoint of urban
society in which trade and commerce had become established,
and he took the view that the economic virtues were to be
applauded. This was quite the contrary of some of the views
that Luther had expressed. Calvin took the view that here was
an activity which had now become part of modern society. The
5. See SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASsMENT OF RIcHEs: AN INTERPRETATION
OF DUTCH CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 331-37 (1988).
6. HENRY WACE & CARL BUCHHEIM, LUTHER'S PRIMARY WoRKs 256-57 (1896),
reprinted in TAWNEY, supra note 3, at 96.
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views of the early church fathers and of those who condemned
this sort of activity had been formed against a background that
no longer existed. He therefore needed to take another look at
this problem in the light of the new situation.
Viewing the problem from this new standpoint, he laid
down certain rules. He accepted the justice and the legitimacy
of high commerce, but subject to this caveat: commerce should
always be conducted with due regard for the high moral stan-
dards taught by religion. You legitimately made your profit
from your burgeoning commerce, but not with a view to indulg-
ing in personal luxury, and not with a view to stepping out of
the rigorous moral discipline to which your religion bound you.
There was therefore a personal responsibility to make your
profits in a legitimate way, in a moral way and to use those
profits also in the same way. In fact, he prescribed a sort of
asceticism, even for those who made these enormous profits,
and he condemned the life of luxury which might have resulted
from this wholesale accumulation of wealth.
This was the reason why, when the Dutch East India
Company was making its enormous profits from its colonial
ventures, it still had spiritual overseers to look over its trans-
actions and ensure that they were conducted according to the
highest principles of morality.
So, that was the view that was taken of business as it
emerged from the early spiritual prohibitions which had sur-
rounded it. But what happened thereafter was, paradoxically,
that once commerce had been released from the fetters in
which it had been kept during the period of church prohibition
and disapproval, it raced away from all controls and forgot the
moral aspect that people like Calvin had so emphasized.
Calvin saw high commerce and industry as being in alli-
ance with morality. The two were interlocked and the first was
not justifiable without the second. But once high commerce
had been released from its medieval fetters, it became difficult
to control. It went off on a voyage of its own and left morality
aside. The moral restraints that Calvin had imposed as a pre-
condition to releasing trade from its spiritual fetters were
forgotten as trade expanded, and traders grew more powerful.
The influence of Calvin and of the Puritans was only a passing
phase in the overall process of the liberation of trade from the
fetters imposed on it by the early doctrine of the Church.
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G. The Treaty of Westphalia
To this religious background, we need to add an element
stemming from the new political configuration of Europe after
the Peace of Westphalia. The connection of trade with ethical
and religious concerns was total until around the time of the
Treaty of Westphalia which liberated States from the tradition-
al hegemony of Papal authority, and launched the completely
secular State on a voyage towards its own betterment, free
largely of the restraints which had circumscribed its activity in
the past. States such as England and Holland were free to
pursue their wars of trade, which have been described as wars
of economic nationalism,' for a State founded on the social
contract, and not on religion, owed its allegiance to the ad-
vancement of the public interest rather than the codes of mo-
rality taught by religion. It needed to pursue its self-interest in
order to survive. In the words of Weber's classic study, The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, "[tihe great and
chief end of men uniting into commonwealths and putting
themselves under government is the preservation of their prop-
erty."8 The wars between England and Holland under the Com-
monwealth and Charles II are cited by economic historians as
an example
H. The Resultant Release of High Commerce from Moral
Restraints
The phenomenon we are now encountering of giantism in
trade, and of this giant power being wielded free of moral re-
straints, is best understood against this historical background.
Once released from its initial shackles, high finance and trade
have proceeded to conquer the world, working out their own
code of morality which sees wealth as an end in itself, rather
than as a means to an end, and money as a value which is
accorded the sacrosanct status that follows when its legitimacy
and power cannot be questioned. Commerce thus reaches its
present position of virtual freedom from the morals of the
society in which it functions. That is the problem we encounter
7. See TAWNEY, supra note 3, at 7.
8. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 183
(Talcott Parsons, trans. 1991).
9. See TAWNEY, supra note 3, at 7.
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today and, if we are to address it, we must view it against its
historical background, and not regard it as a phenomenon that
has always existed and will therefore continue to be with us
until the end of time.
V. THE ANALOGY WITH TECHNOLOGY REVISITED
I see an analogy here with technology, which I referred to
earlier. Sophisticated technology was known to many civiliza-
tions before it came to the West. Chinese civilization, Indian
civilization, and Arab civilization all had fairly sophisticated
technology, but this was kept within the mores of those societ-
ies.
But when technology came to the West, whether it be in
the form of gunpowder or the mariner's compass or even print-
ing, it raced out of control. And when you philosophize on the
reason for that, you can trace it back to the path that Francis
Bacon charted out for scientific inquiry-that it must be pur-
sued free of all the superstitions of the marketplace, free of the
superstitions of religion, free of the inhibitions imposed by
society. The scientific inquirer is engaged in the pursuit of
truth, and should not permit himself to be deterred from this
quest by outmoded restraints and prohibitions. Basically that
was the kind of liberation that technology received through the
philosophy of Bacon."
In regard to commerce and industry, the liberating philos-
ophy of Calvin was different from the liberating philosophy of
Bacon regarding technology, in that Calvin coupled the libera-
tion of commerce with moral restraints. Yet in both cases, the
liberation moved away from moral restraints. The legitimiza-
tion of free inquiry, like the legitimization of commerce, was
seen as giving these enterprises a sovereignty of their own. As
a result, in commerce as in science, a situation was reached
where the mores of the community, as well as the legal system
of the community, were almost powerless to control it.
That, I believe, is part of the problem that we are address-
ing in this seminar today. That historical overview may per-
haps be useful in attuning us to the dimensions of the prob-
lems we are facing. Because law is not an omnipotent instru-
ment, law can only control matters that lie within the reach of
10. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 2, ch. 1.
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its formalized principles and prohibitions, and of its ability to
oversee and punish. But some of these activities, in both tech-
nology and high commerce, have reached a stage where they
are so powerful and complex that they are racing out of the
area of legal accountability.
VI. AN APPROACH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CONTRACT LAW
Globalization of commerce is one of the strongest of the
factors producing this result. Let me just approach this from
the standpoint of contract law, the department of law most
intimately concerned with trade and commerce.
If you look at the contract law, in 1900 the belief that was
widely prevalent among contract lawyers was that contract is
after all the product of two freely consenting minds. There is a
bargain that is struck between two people who are willing
parties to the agreement. So let not the court interfere, let not
the government interfere. That is sacred ground, for it is an
area of operation of two freely consenting minds and thus any
interference in this area is an interference with the autonomy
and freedom of the individual. The area which these two freely
consenting wills have carved out for themselves must therefore
be left- intact unless it violated some specific legal prohibition.
That was the accepted thinking of contract lawyers at the
beginning of this century.
At the end of this century, -that thinking has been virtually
turned upon its head. Practically every jurisdiction in the
world accepts that, despite the apparent meeting of two freely
consenting minds, there can be unfair contracts resulting from
inequality of bargaining power. It is accepted therefore that it
is the duty of the court, the duty of the government, and the
duty of legislators to interfere on the side of the weaker bar-
gaining party, so as to restore some semblance of equality in
the bargaining process and overcome the myth of a free con-
tract reached by two freely consenting minds. That is contract
law, as it is understood in all jurisdictions in this closing phase
of the 20th century.
But an important reservation is this: that this is contract
law as it is understood domestically. On the other hand, what
is contract law as it is understood internationally? What is the
position in the international marketplace? It is the fierce free-
for-all, the tooth-and-claw competition of the Hobbesian variety
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which prevails in the international marketplace. International
contract law remains largely where domestic contract law was
at the beginning of the century. It is a hundred years behind.
Though every domestic contract lawyer will affirm that
parties of unequal bargaining power need to be protected
through some sort of legal protection of the weaker bargaining
party, nothing of that sort appears in the international mar-
ketplace, where the more important and far reaching contracts
are made that govern the entirety of global trade. Contract
lawyers have not worked adequately on this, deterred no doubt
by the fact that, unlike in the domestic context, there is no
international agency with overarching authority that can im-
pose conditions of fairness in the way a domestic legislature or
judiciary can. Yet, the counterpart of legislation in the interna-
tional field is the treaty, and treaties are based upon the
parties' inherent sense of fairness. Can we not, in the century
that is about to dawn, insert into international treaties the
principles of fairness in contract which we accept in all domes-
tic jurisdictions? It is true, self-interest is a dominant force
that drives international treaties. Yet we have seen in many
areas how considerations of international fairness have over-
ridden considerations of the self-interest of individual States,
so that they have been willing subscribing parties to treaties
which, viewed from the standpoint of individual State self-
interest, may not appear to be in the best interests of those
States. The self-interested and powerful forces ranged on the
side of slavery were overcome by the power of compassion and
reason. Should not the future see a similar humanitarianism
overpowering the self-interested forces that insist on the unin-
hibited bargaining process between unequals that dominates
international trade?
In the international marketplace, poor countries trade
with rich countries, poor producers with buyers who can buy
their produce from half a dozen different places and can lay
down their terms, and there is no protective mechanism in
place to give corresponding protection to that which all domes-
tic legal systems give to their weaker bargaining parties. This
is one of the great problems we are faced with, and many lead-
ers of third world countries have pointed this out. I think the
presidents of some African countries have pointed out that,
where formerly we wanted say one bag or ten bags of sisal, or
whatever, to buy one jeep, today we have to produce twenty
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bags or thirty bags to buy that one jeep. The value of those
extra bags which represent extra effort from their countries is
therefore going into somebody's pockets somewhere. They don't
know where exactly, but they are getting an unequal bargain
and an increasingly unequal bargain because they are more
and more dependent upon countries that have the technology
to give them the manufactured goods that they want and can-
not produce. They can only sell them their raw materials and
they are the weaker bargaining party who are taken advantage
of in this fierce free-for-all competition of the international
marketplace.
So, that is one perspective from domestic contract law
which may be useful when we consider the work of these great
traders who straddle national boundaries and operate in terms
of billions of dollars, and consequently bargain from a position
of overwhelming strength.
VII. THE DISBANDING OF EMPIRES
I will now give you another analogy that comes to my
mind which will demonstrate the immense financial weakness
of the developing countries. In the days of the great empires, a
number of colonies forming part of these huge empires resem-
bled vast commercial conglomerates. Take the British Empire
for example. Each of the countries in the Empire could produce
some particular commodity much better than most others. For
example, Burma could produce rice, Malaysia could produce
tin, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) could produce tea and so forth. So long
as the whole organization held together, that was a fine com-
mercial basis on which the entire administration could run.
Each of the specialist producers could produce each of the
commodities which they could produce better than anybody
else. They could concentrate on producing that particular com-
modity because their basic needs could be supplied through the
infrastructure that was available for the whole empire. So,
that was fine.
It was like one large department store with a confectionery
department and a perfumery department and a camera depart-
ment and so on. Each of those departments specialized in what
they were doing. But all of them were serviced by the basic
infrastructure.
Now, if you dismantle that department store, and let each
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of those different entities proceed as separate businesses on
their own, there will be chaos because they would not have the
necessary infrastructure to service their basic needs. The cam-
era department, the confectionery department, and the perfum-
ery department, now shops in their own right but with no
infrastructure to keep them going as separate entities, would
need time to procure their own independent background servic-
es and sources of supply. If called upon to do business straight-
away, they would collapse. And that's what seems to have hap-
pened in many former colonial countries, because the infra-
structure that for many centuries gave the people the food they
wanted and the sort of lifestyle they required, was destroyed or
permitted to lapse into desuetude over centuries of domination
by a regime which was primarily structured to serve the needs
of the metropolitan power rather than of the territory in ques-
tion.
All of a sudden when their territories received indepen-
dence, they found that they were without the basic infrastruc-
ture that had served their people for centuries if not millennia.
It is little wonder that they were unable to manage their own
affairs, for they needed at least a generation or two to restore
the infrastructure that had served them before the advent of
the empires. That is an economic problem that is not often per-
ceived-that the great department stores constituting the great
empires have been dismantled and the individual departments
have been released to sink or swim on their own. International
law needs to take note of this aspect which is so often swept
under the carpet as if it were no one's responsibility.
VIII. THE CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY
Another aspect which is relevant to this discussion is the
choice of technology. Technology is generally produced in the
industrialized countries and the developing countries receive
the technology thus developed. This technology is often tailored
to the needs of the developed countries, but has to be received
by the developing countries in the form in which they find it.
This raises a great question of the choice of technology, on
which much has been written in recent times. Who decides
what technology is to be imported into developing countries?
Each developing country has a little elite group of its own.
Very often they have been educated in, or have many contacts
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with, the industrialized countries. It is these people in posi-
tions of authority who determine what particular technology
that country would absorb. That group often has more in com-
mon with the industrialized producing group than it has in
common with its own people. They often have financial con-
tacts with them and with the vast agencies of production. The
decision regarding choice of technology therefore tends to be
one which is slanted in the direction of some particular country
or manufacturer with which that particular elitist group has
some alliance.
I once did a study for the United Nations University on
this aspect and we found lots of details on this which we put in
two volumes which we produced on the question of technology
transfer and the way in which elites in third world societies
very often are in league with the producers in some of the
major industrialized countries. The country receiving the tech-
nology therefore does not receive the technology which is most
adapted to it, or of which it is in most in need, but one which
may be tailored to meet the needs or interests of some other
foreign group."
Now, another factor, and here I blame the developing
countries, is the fact of corruption. There is a great deal of
corruption in many countries which prevents the benefit of
commerce, industry or technology from reaching the grass
roots. Indeed, this has become so much of a problem that the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other lending
institutions have now put out documents laying it down as a
condition that, before aid is given to any receiving country,
there should be a check or some sort of consideration given to
this question of corruption, because corruption siphons off from
the people a huge amount of the benefit which is intended for
them. This is a problem which urgently needs to be looked
into.
IX. POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY
The next question which I would like to refer to very brief-
ly is the question of power without responsibility. It is a basic
11. See Saneh Chamarik, Technological Self-reliance and Cultural Freedom, in
HUMAN RIGHTs AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 39 (Christopher
Weeramantry ed., 1990).
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axiom of democracy that if there is power, there must be re-
sponsibility.
When developing countries deal with large multinationals,
the multinational is often in a position of dominance, whether
by reason of its enormous resources or by reason of its monopo-
ly of the desired technology. Its power is very often larger than
that of many a nation State of the world. Indeed, the economic
power of several individual multinationals is greater than that
of more than three-quarters of the nation States of the world.
But it is power which they wield in the territory of the devel-
oping countries, without any responsibility or accountability. It
is therefore contrary to a basic democratic principle which
postulates that power without responsibility is anathema to
the democratic ideal.
This is a major question which we as international lawyers
and human rights lawyers need to address. How can we bring
the principle of accountability into this phenomenal exercise of
power? And if we do not, well, we are helping onwards the
violation of one of the basic tenets of democratic rule and dem-
ocratic tradition.
So, this is something again which becomes even more
difficult to work to its logical conclusion when you see that
these organizations are very often quite amorphous, thus ren-
dering the question of accountability even more difficult.
There was some discussion this morning about not being
able to see who is behind some particular activity. Very often
that applies even to the multinational corporations themselves.
There are some enormous corporations that have operations in
maybe fifty different countries and with five hundred different
corporate registrations. And sometimes it would take years of
research to get to the bottom of some particular activity and
trace it to its actual source, because there are all these veils of
multiple corporate registration which stand between the deci-
sion-maker and the visible consequences of his or her action.
So, power without accountability is a very important as-
pect which we have to address when we are dealing with the
proliferation of power that comes with modern business enter-
prise.
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X. THE ARTIFICIAL CREATION OF WANTS
Another aspect is the artificial creation of wants. It is true
multinational corporations have many achievements to their
credit and have enormous potential to do good throughout the
world. But there is often also the possibility that wants which
never existed are often created artificially by them in many
countries.
Some years ago I was working on the Nauru Commission
of Inquiry. You might be familiar with the Nauru Commission,
whose work on phosphate mining in that country led to a claim
by Nauru against Australia before the International Court of
Justice.' As Chairman of that Commission, I had to study in
great detail the practices of the trading companies in the Pacif-
ic. Some of those early trading companies-the German trad-
ing companies were among the earliest-were in the situation
where they needed the goods of those Pacific islands, but those
countries needed little, because they had an idyllic lifestyle, ob-
taining all their needs by way of food, housing, and other nec-
essaries from the sea and from their land. They did not have
many wants. So the problem the traders addressed was how to
-induce the creation of wants. Two ways in which they did this
were by setting up "smoking schools," and by distributing fire-
arms.
"Smoking schools" were places where the people were
exposed to the habit of smoking, as both a source of pleasure
and a status symbol. Once young people were "hooked" on the
habit by inducements of various sorts including free cigarettes,
they were told, "Well, now, if you want tobacco, you will pay
for it." And so the smoking schools created a new want in that
society which never existed before.
The other principal means resorted to for creating new
wants was the gift of firearms to a few people. Some young
men went back to their villages and demonstrated their new
found power, and for the one gun that was given free, ten guns
were demanded by people who wanted to have this new symbol
of status and power.
So new wants were created and then, of course, there was
something which the traders could offer in exchange for the
12. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 240
(June 26) (preliminary objections).
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produce of those countries which the traders needed. This
helped to drain out such wealth as those countries possessed.
One may think these are practices of the past, but I recall
reading an article in the Reader's Digest recently about similar
practices today for inducing the cigarette smoking habit in the
young people of developing countries.
Many years ago, I spent some months at the University of
Papua New Guinea, and I can recount two relevant episodes
from my experiences there. One was that I observed one day,
when I looked at the newspaper, that there were full-page
advertisements of the cigarette companies. You know the usual
ads that you see of cigarette companies advertising smoking as
conducive to health and symptomatic of an elegant lifestyle. I
was wondering why they were advertising so heavily and, upon
inquiry, I was told that a law restrictive of tobacco advertise-
ments was about to be enacted, and that the manufacturers
were attempting to derive the maximum benefit from the pre-
existing state of the law before the proposed restrictions be-
came effective.
The second episode also bears on the way in which artifi-
cial wants are created in communities that do not really need
them. I was once on a plane travelling from Port Moresby,
which is the capital, to Mount Hagen in the interior of the
island. That particular area was a very traditional place where
people had lived their lifestyle unhindered for generations. It
was a small plane we travelled on. There must have been
about ten people on it. That evening we all met in the hotel
lobby at our destination, and there was a young man there
who was recounting with much satisfaction that he had
brought a whole consignment of fast foods to the area. He had
come there with a view to hiring a plane and dropping them in
small packets in the public park and other public areas.
The idea was that when all this confectionery was dropped
in little bags, in places where the children would congregate,
the children would take some packets, go to their parents and
tell them what a nice new food this was, and put pressure on
them to acquire more. An artificial want would thus be created
and demand could be sponsored and stimulated by further
campaigns like this.
This young man didn't seem to think there was anything
wrong with what he was doing. It was a story of commercial
enterprise and success. But in this traditional place which had
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lived its own lifestyle for centuries, if not millennia, a new
artificial want was created and after three or four expeditions
there would be a demand for these products. That would be a
result applauded by directors and shareholders in a distant
metropolitan capital. When we deal with the challenge of glob-
al markets, we cannot afford to lose sight of human aspects
such as those which are typified by this little scenario.
This is an important area which we must watch in relation
to the activities of these major centres of economic power, and
it is time perhaps to assess the ethics concerning the artificial
creation of wants in this fashion. Once the want is created and
the demand is there, then, of course, the bargaining position
alters to the detriment of the receiving country and the benefit
of the foreign commercial organization.
XI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The field of intellectual property is another area beset
with great problems. It has often struck me that intellectual
property gives rise to many ethical problems in international
trade.
Let us think of the case of the inventor of something new,
who is entitled to a proprietary interest in his product. But
what if the product has some social value? For example, what
if somebody tomorrow finds an instant cancer cure. This is an
extreme and perhaps fanciful example, but suppose ten of
those pills would cure the disease. The inventor may have the
right to place any price he wants upon his product, but is there
not some social interest in the product which must lower the
expectancy of the author or the inventor? So long as he has
some recompense for what he has put into it, that would be
fair, but can a socially useful and indeed vital invention be
exploited without regard to the social interest? That is a factor
highlighted by the extreme example I have offered you, but it
is important to reflect whether such social exploitation does
not take place in a dozen spheres-to a lesser degree perhaps
than in the example I have given you, but all the same in
violation of the principle that the social interest in the inven-
tion is an important factor to be taken into account. The disre-
gard of the social interest becomes particularly severe where
the people desperately needing the invention are people of the
developing world, who do not have the economic muscle to
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bargain for a fair recognition of the human dimensions of the
problem.
The best examples of this come from the sphere of agricul-
tural products and foodstuffs. These items of merchandise are
essential for people, and cannot be overpriced merely because
the inventor needs to get his profit. In items of importance to
third world agriculture, there is much exploitation that can
and does take place in such areas. In the African situation, for
example, a pest-resistant kind of chemical may be desired that
is the answer to some agricultural problem of the farmers, and
the farmers purchase it and find that it keeps the pesticidal fly
or bacteria at bay. That's fine for that year and the next year.
But two years later, when the bacterium or fly breeds a
resistance to the pesticide, and it is no longer adequate for the
purpose, a new version is put out at a higher price. By now the
farmer is dependent on it and must purchase the new product
at any price. The multinational puts out the new version of
this product at an increased price, and the farmer is caught up
in an ever escalating spiral of price increases as new products
emerge to fight new elements of drug resistance. As the price
keeps escalating, depending on the interest of the multination-
al, the farmer's dependence on the new products is heightened.
So, these are some of the aspects that we have to look into,
which sometimes are almost beyond the power of nation States
to control.
XII. DUMPING OF GOODS
Dumping of shoddy goods is another example. We know of
cases where highly deleterious substances have been surrepti-
tiously dumped in countries. A land owner in some country
feels that it would be worth his while receiving a huge fee from
a corporation for burying on his land the refuse that the corpo-
ration sends him. It is a highly noxious material which may
damage that land for generations, but still there may be no
controls upon it. The noxious waste arrives disguised as some
sort of merchandise and is buried on his land. This problem
has in fact occurred in third world countries.
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XIII. THE NEED FOR ETHICAL CODES
Now, what is the answer to all this? Of course, one answer
is ethical codes. We must raise the level of awareness of the
damage that could be done, and sensitize the conscience of the
multinationals who send out this waste, and sensitize their
shareholders as well to make them more demanding of a high
ethical standard on the part of directors of the companies
which, after all, they-the shareholders-own. The idea that
the company exists to make profits for its shareholders at all
costs has to be mitigated in some way by placing on the share-
holders the responsibility for the moral wrongdoings that are
very often committed in their name.
I know that in the case of the dismantling of apartheid, it
was possible, through sensitizing the conscience of sharehold-
ers to produce a sufficient impact on the trade of many compa-
nies to make a difference to the South African situation.
Shareholder action in disapproving of trade with South Africa
in many areas played a significant role in dismantling the
structure of apartheid. That may well be one of the parallels
which we could invoke for the purpose of the matters we are
discussing at this conference. Is there something that we could
do by way of a stimulation of the conscience and the sensitivi-
ties of the shareholders of the great corporations that indulge
in unfair trade practices vis-h-vis the developing countries?
The fact that ethical codes are being propagated and that
they are increasing in their range and reach is a most signifi-
cant factor we must take into account, for the problems we are
considering are not merely problems of law but problems of
ethics as well. We have seen a proliferation of such ethical
codes, and we see that these codes are beginning to encompass
a wider area of activity than ever before.
XIV. NEW MULTINATIONAL ACTORS
We have to realize that these entities that trade across
national boundaries have enormous power, and that they are
the new non-State actors who have appeared on the interna-
tional stage, whose power is even so great that they can topple
governments. At the last conference that was held at the
American Society of International Law, there were a number of
instances given of multinationals being powerful enough to
topple governments in other countries.
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Huge movements of capital may be another way in which
developing countries can be destabilized. We witness the new
phenomenon here of trade, not in commodities but in curren-
cies themselves, and that is a new development for which our
international legal systems are not quite ready as yet. More-
over, it can occur now with lightening rapidity owing to the
possibilities of instant electronic transfers of funds which mod-
ern technology makes possible.
And, as another factor to which we must give our atten-
tion, we must note that information has become a new source
of power, and that those who command vast quantities of infor-
mation command the economic power that goes with it. We
need to gear ourselves towards addressing this new problem as
well.
There are a number of blind spots in our vision of the
world order, especially on the human rights scene, which must
be addressed. I myself have written a couple of articles on
what I have sometimes described as a blind spot in human
rights and international law, namely the armaments indus-
try.3 Despite all its human rights violations, the armaments
industry seems to flourish. Although it deals in ever more
sophisticated weapons of destruction, it is permitted to sell
death wholesale. It does so in public, in the most prestigious
parts of a city, and attracts the most powerful patrons. By
contrast, the small drug peddlar is hauled before the magis-
trate and severely dealt with, while the wholesale trade in
death flourishes with scarcely a murmur of protest from the
law. There is, indeed, an anomaly here, which human rights
and international law must address.
XV. THE POWER OF LOBBY GROUPS
Another blind spot is the way in which different interest
groups can influence governments, even to the extent of influ-
encing their presentation of globally important matters before
international bodies. At the last American Society of Interna-
tional Law meeting, reference was made to a number of ways
13. See Traffic in Armaments: A Blind Spot in Human Rights and Interna-
tional Law, 2 DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE, J. DAG HAMMARSKJOLD FOUNDATION 68
(1987), reprinted in 1 Justice Without Frontiers: Furthering Human Rights 228
(1997).
BROOK. J. INTL L.
in which .1e presentations of nation States before some world
organizations have been prepared for them by some interest
groups. They may be oil or gas interests, for example, which
have a point of view to present which runs counter to environ-
mental interests. This is one example which can be cited of
such interests being able to speak through the voices of nation
States themselves. So great is their power.
XVI. SOME CHECKS ON COMMERCIAL POWER
Well, today's conference on the "Challenge of Global Mar-
kets" has revealed a number of ways in which new methods
are being devised to keep all this surplus of commercial power
in check. We have a long way to go before we can meaningfully
address all these challenges and devise ways of ensuring
equality before the law of these multinational corporations.
Increasing shareholders' sensitivity is one method, and brand
resistance is another. Focusing on the corporation's image may
be another means, for they do take this into account as they
fear the tarnishing of their corporate image. A number of
NGOs and others have been working in these fields and the
large companies have proved sensitive to these pressures.
XVII. POSITIVE ACTION BY STATES
Another avenue to be explored is the obligation of States
under international law not merely to act as though they have
negative obligations in regard to human rights, but to gear
themselves towards positive action in the furtherance of hu-
man rights.
When there is some corporation functioning within their
territory which denigrates human rights, it is not for them to
turn a blind eye to the activities of the corporation and say
that such action is not the action of the State. States must see
it as part of their business to look into the human rights deni-
als that might result from the activities of the corporations
which function on their territory. Research needs to be done at
both the theoretical and practical level to formulate and devel-
op the necessary principles, and to identify and make particu-
lar case studies of specific instances. There is a large field of
research here awaiting academic attention.
So, all these are just a few thoughts which I thought I
would share with you in relation to the subject matter of your
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conference. I found it most stimulating to attend this morning
and hear the different ideas that have been put before the
participants.
We have to move towards a new legal order. We are deal-
ing with multinational actors who should be brought within
the mores of human rights, and the principle of accountability.
They are bound by international law which is often not tuned
finely enough to reach them, and they must function within
the matrix of human rights. Ensuring these is the responsibili-
ty of international lawyers, no less than of States and govern-
ments.
These results must be achieved not merely de jure but also
de facto, because, very often, mere compliance with the law
does not achieve the intended result. The principles you have
in the law books are not always the principles that operate in
the field. It is our responsibility to see that the principles and
mechanisms are so formulated as to ensure that this happens
de facto. Those vast powers which can be used for the pursuit
of private gain need to be used with the sense of responsibility
that befits important actors in the field of international law.
Multinationals are responsible actors in international law no
less than States, and the sooner this is realized, the better it
will be for human rights across the globe. We must attune the
international law of the future to the concept that a large vari-
ety of new actors have appeared on the international scene,
with rights and responsibilities which international law will
recognize as inhering in them. The great corporations are a
very important group of these new international actors whom
the law of the future will recognize as accountable to the inter-
national legal system. That will be an important contribution
which we, as international lawyers studying the challenges of
the global marketplace, will be called upon to make. It will be
a principal key to the global human rights culture in which we
shall all have to operate in the century that is about to dawn.
Thank you.

